From Viewstamped Replication to Blockchains
This talk will discuss two replication protocols. The first, Viewstamped Replication, was developed in the 1980s when research on replication protocols was concerned primarily with systems that survived crash failures, e.g., individual replicas could fail only by crashing. Viewstamped replication is similar to Paxos; it was the earliest practical replication algorithm that provided the ability to execute general operations (as opposed to just reads and writes).
In the 1990s, researchers became interested in systems that could survive Byzantine failures, in which replicas fail arbitrarily. Replicated systems that survive Byzantine failures are substantially more complex, requiring both more replicas and more phases of communication, than those that survive only crash failures. The talk will present PBFT, the first practical replication technique that handles Byzantine failures. PBFT is now of great interest to researchers working on blockchains.
Algorithms for the People
Algorithms have transformed every aspect of society, including communication, transportation, commerce, finance, and health. The revolution enabled by computing has been extraordinarily valuable. The largest tech companies generate a trillion dollars a year and employ 1 million people. But technology does not affect everyone in the same way. In this talk, we will examine how new technologies affect marginalized communities and think about what technology and academic research would look like if its goal was to serve the disenfranchised.
Engineering with Full-scale Formal Architecture: Morello, CHERI, Armv8-A, and RISC-V
Architecture specifications define the fundamental interface between hardware and software. Historically, mainstream architecture specifications have been informal prose-and-pseudocode documents.
This talk will describe our work to establish and use mechanised semantics for full-scale instruction-set architectures (ISAs): the mainstream Armv8-A architecture, the emerging RISC-V architecture, the CHERI-MIPS and CHERI-RISC-V research architectures that use hardware capabilities for improved security, and Arm’s prototype Morello architecture – an industrial demonstrator incorporating the CHERI ideas.
We use a variety of tools, especially our Sail ISA definition language and Isla symbolic evaluation engine, to build semantic definitions that are readable, executable as test oracles, support reasoning within the Coq, HOL4, and Isabelle proof assistants, support SMT-based symbolic evaluation, support model-based test generation, and can be integrated with operational and axiomatic concurrency models. These models are all complete enough to boot operating systems and hypervisors, covering the full sequential ISA (though not other SoC components, such as the Arm Generic Interrupt Controller). They range from 5000 to 60000 lines of specification.
For CHERI-MIPS and CHERI-RISC-V, we have used Sail models (and previously L3 models) as the golden reference during design, working with our systems and computer architecture colleagues in the CHERI team to use lightweight formal specification routinely in documentation, testing, and test generation. We have stated and proved (in Isabelle) some of the fundamental intended security properties of the full CHERI-MIPS ISA.
For Armv8-A, building on Arm’s internal shift to an executable model in their ASL language, we have the complete sequential ISA semantics automatically translated from the Arm ASL to Sail, and for RISC-V, we have hand-written what is now the offically adopted model. For their concurrent semantics, the “user” semantics, partly as a result of our collaborations with Arm and within the RISC-V concurrency task group, have become simplified and well-defined, with multiple models proved equivalent, and we are currently working on the “system” semantics. Our symbolic execution tool for Sail specifications, Isla, supports axiomatic concurrency models over the full ISA.
Morello, supported by the UKRI Digital Security by Design programme, offers a path to hardware enforcement of fine-grained memory safety and/or secure encapsulation in the production Armv8-A architecture, potentially excluding or mitigating a large fraction of today’s security vulnerabilities for existing C/C++ code with little modification. During the ISA design process, we have proved (in Isabelle) fundamental security properties for the complete Morello ISA definition, and generated tests from the definition which were used during hardware development and for QEMU bring-up.
All these tools and models are (or will soon be) available under open-source licenses, providing well-validated models for others to use and build on.
Active Automata Learning: from L* to L#
In this tutorial on active automata learning algorithms, I will start with the famous L* algorithm proposed by Dana Angluin in 1987, and explain how this algorithm approximates the Nerode congruence by means of refinement. Next, I will present a brief overview of the various improvements of the L^* algorithm that have been proposed over the years. Finally, I will introduce L#, a new and simple approach to active automata learning. Instead of focusing on equivalence of observations, like the L* algorithm and its descendants, L# takes a different perspective: it tries to establish apartness, a constructive form of inequality.
Stainless Verification System Tutorial
Stainless ( https://stainless.epfl.ch ) is an open-source tool for verifying and finding errors in programs written in the Scala programming language. This tutorial will not assume any knowledge of Scala. It aims to get first-time users started with verification tasks by introducing the language, providing modelling and verification tips, and giving a glimpse of the tool’s inner workings (encoding into functional programs, function unfolding, and using theories of satisfiability modulo theory solvers Z3 and CVC4).
Stainless (and its predecessor, Leon) has been developed primarily in the EPFL’s Laboratory for Automated Reasoning and Analysis in the period from 2011-2021. Its core specification and implementation language are typed recursive higher-order functional programs (imperative programs are also supported by automated translation to their functional semantics). Stainless can verify that functions are correct for all inputs with respect to provided preconditions and postconditions, it can prove that functions terminate (with optionally provided termination measure functions), and it can provide counter-examples to safety properties. Stainless enables users to write code that is both executed and verified using the same source files. Users can compile programs using the Scala compiler and run them on the JVM. For programs that adhere to certain discipline, users can generate source code in a small fragment of C and then use standard C compilers.
Reactive Synthesis Beyond Realizability
The automatic synthesis of reactive systems from high-level specifications is a highly attractive and increasingly viable alternative to manual system design, with applications in a number of domains such as robotic motion planning, control of autonomous systems, and development of communication protocols. The idea of asking the system designer to describe what the system should do instead of how exactly it does it, holds a great promise. However, providing the right formal specification of the desired behaviour of a system is a challenging task in itself. In practice it often happens that the system designer provides a specification that is unrealizable, that is, there is no implementation that satisfies it. Such situations typically arise because the desired behavior represents a trade-off between multiple conflicting requirements, or because crucial assumptions about the environment in which the system will execute are missing. Addressing such scenarios necessitates a shift towards synthesis algorithms that utilize quantitative measures of system correctness. In this tutorial I will discuss two recent advances in this research direction.
First, I will talk about the maximum realizability problem, where the input to the synthesis algorithm consists of a hard specification which must be satisfied by the synthesized system, and soft specifications which describe other desired, possibly prioritized properties, whose violation is acceptable. I will present a synthesis algorithm that maximizes a quantitative value associated with the soft specifications, while guaranteeing the satisfaction of the hard specification. In the second half of the tutorial I will present algorithms for synthesis in bounded environments, where a bound is associated with the sequences of input values produced by the environment. More concretely, these sequences consists of an initial prefix followed by a finite sequence repeated infinitely often, and satisfy the constraint that the sum of the lengths of the initial prefix and the loop does not exceed a given bound. I will also discuss the synthesis of approximate implementations from unrealizable specifications, which are guaranteed to satisfy the specification on at least a specified portion of the bounded-size input sequences. I will conclude by outlining some of the open avenues and challenges in quantitative synthesis from temporal logic specifications.
Formal Methods for the Security Analysis of Smart Contracts
Smart contracts consist of distributed programs built over a blockchain and they are emerging as a disruptive paradigm to perform distributed computations in a secure and efficient way. Given their nature, however, program flaws may lead to dramatic financial losses and can be hard to fix. This motivates the need for formal methods that can provide smart contract developers with correctness and security guarantees, ideally automating the verification task.
This tutorial introduces the semantic foundations of smart contracts and reviews the state-of-the-art in the field, focusing in particular on the automated, sound, static analysis of Ethereum smart contracts. We will highlight the strengths and drawbacks of different methods, suggesting open challenges that can stimulate new research strands. Finally, we will overview eThor, an automated static analysis tool that we recently developed based on rigorous semantic foundations.