

Model Checking AUTOSAR Components with CBMC

Timothée Durand ¹ Katalin Fazekas ²
Georg Weissenbacher ² Jakob Zwirchmayr ¹




¹TTTech AUTO AG, Vienna, Austria



Informatics

²TU Wien, Vienna, Austria


Monday 4th October, 2021




Self driving cars bring new technological challenges:

- Increase of safety requirements & complexity
- Centralized ECU architecture, Communication Systems...
- Established safety norms

Driver Assistance (ADAS)




Chassis & Powertrain




Safety / Performance
Microcontrollers



Infotainment



Platform Services




Automobile Software Components

Driver Assistance (ADAS)



Chassis & Powertrain




Standards:
- AUTOSAR


Safety / Performance
Microcontrollers



Infotainment




Platform Services




Safety Critical Automobile Software Components

Driver Assistance (ADAS)



Chassis & Powertrain




Standards:

- AUTOSAR
- ISO 26262: ASIL


Safety / Performance
Microcontrollers



Infotainment



Platform Services



Safety critical

D

B

C

A


QM

No safety guarantees

Automotive Software Architecture


AUTOSAR - The Standardized Automotive Architecture

- AUTOSAR: Automotive Software Architecture Standard (2006)
- Defines common
 - architecture
 - interfaces
 - specifications
- Simplifies
 - integration
 - cooperation
 - code reusability




Focus on Software Components (SW-C)


- Diversity of application SW-C:
 - Safety critical services
 - Infotainment
- Composability safety concepts
 - Safely add/remove SW-C
 - *modular verification*
- Interaction through RTE
 - inter-SW-C communication
 - read sensor values
 - network communication



- Isolate and inspect one SW-C at a time
- Abstract RTE communication interfaces
- Simulate interactions using Non-Deterministic stubs
- Verify safety properties:
Run-time errors



SW-C verification framework



RTE Abstraction

ARXML (AUTOSAR-XML) provides:

- list of ports
- data-type specifications

```
<APPLICATION-SW-COMPONENT-TYPE>
  <SHORT-NAME>CtApSoftwareComponent1</SHORT-NAME>
  <PORTS>
    <R-PORT-PROTOTYPE>
      <SHORT-NAME>PpSwc1Temperature</SHORT-NAME>
      <REQUIRED-COM-SPECS>
        <NONQUEUED-RECEIVER-COM-SPEC>
          <DATA-ELEMENT-REF>
            /PortInterfaces/PiSwc1/DeTemperature
          ...
        <TYPE-TREF>
          /DataTypes/Dt_TemperatureData
```

```
1 int Rte_Read_DeTemperature(Dt_TemperatureData* data)
```

```
<IMPLEMENTATION-DATA-TYPE>
  <SHORT-NAME>Dt_TemperatureData</SHORT-NAME>
  <CATEGORY>STRUCTURE</CATEGORY>
  <SUB-ELEMENTS>
    <SHORT-NAME>DeTemperature</SHORT-NAME>
      <IMPLEMENTATION-DATA-TYPE-REF>
        /DataTypes/Dt_Temperature
      ...
    <SHORT-NAME>DeTimestamp</SHORT-NAME>
      <IMPLEMENTATION-DATA-TYPE-REF>
        /DataTypes/Dt_Timestamp
```

```
1 struct Dt_TemperatureData {
2     Dt_Temperature DeTemperature;
3     Dt_Timestamp DeTimestamp;
4 };
```

```
<IMPLEMENTATION-DATA-TYPE>  
  <SHORT-NAME>Dt_Temperature</SHORT-NAME>  
  <CATEGORY>VALUE</CATEGORY>  
  <BASE-TYPE-REF>/DataTypes/BaseTypes/sint16</BASE-TYPE-REF>  
  <DATA-CONSTR-REF>/DataConstrs/Temp_DataConstr</DATA-CONSTR>  
  ...  
  <LOWER-LIMIT>-273</LOWER-LIMIT>  
  <UPPER-LIMIT>1000</UPPER-LIMIT>
```

Non-deterministic RTE Datatype generator:

```
1 Dt_Temperature nondet_Dt_Temperature() {  
2   Dt_Temperature res = nondet_sint16();  
3   assume(res >= -273 && res <= 1000);  
4   return res;  
5 }
```

```
1 Dt_Temperature nondet_Dt_Temperature() {  
2     Dt_Temperature res = nondet_sint16();  
3     assume(res >= -273 && res <= 1000);  
4     return res;  
5 }  
6  
7 int STUB_Rte_Read_DeTemperature  
8     (Dt_TemperatureData *data) {  
9     data->DeTemperature = nondet_Dt_Temperature();  
10    data->DeTimestamp = nondet_Dt_Timestamp();  
11    return 0;  
12 }
```

Software Component Verification Harness

SW-C codebase

RTE abstraction


```
1 int main()
2 {
3     // initialize
4     // global variables
5     initialize();
6
7     while(1)
8     {
9         // periodically
10        // maintain state
11        maintain();
12    }
13 }
```

```
1 int STUB_Rte_Read_Engine_RPM
2   (Dt_EngineRPM* data)
3   {
4       //...
5   }
6
7 int STUB_Rte_Read_DeTemperature
8   (Dt_TemperatureData* data)
9   {
10      //...
11  }
12
13 int STUB_Rte_Write_FanSpeed
14 ...
```

⇒ Over-approximates the reachable state space

Verification methods

SW-C verification framework




Inductive Case

Base Case / Bounded model checking

```
1 int main()
2 {
3     initialize();
4     int i;
5     for(i=0; i < k; i++)
6     {
7         maintain();
8         assert(/*no errors*/);
9     }
10 }
```

```
1 int main()
2 {
3     initialize();
4
5     // simulate arbitrary
6     // loop iteration
7     global_var = nondet();
8
9     int i;
10    for(i=0; i < k+1; i++)
11    {
12        assume(/*no errors*/);
13        maintain();
14    }
15    assert(/*no errors*/);
16 }
```

Both versions of the code are fed to CBMC which determines the reachability of error states.



Challenges for model checking:


- Numerous function pointers
- Weak induction hypothesis
- Unclear SW-C boundaries

Frama-C's EVA plugin (Abstract Interpretation) provides:


- Value-ranges for global variables
- Call graph

Static analysis: Resolve function pointers

Without static analysis



With static analysis




Note: Correctness of function pointer restriction is verified (Induction proof)

Static analysis: Strengthen induction hypothesis


Without static analysis

```
1 // simulate arbitrary
2 // loop iteration
3 global_var = nondet();
```



With static analysis

```
1 // simulate arbitrary
2 // loop iteration
3 global_var = nondet();
4 assume(
5   global_var  $\in$  Range)
```



Note: Correctness of states restriction is verified (Induction proof)

Static analysis: Strengthen induction hypothesis

Inductive Case

Base Case / Bounded model checking

```
1 int main()
2 {
3     initialize();
4     int i;
5     for(i=0; i < k; i++)
6     {
7         maintain();
8         assert(
9             global_vars ∈ Range);
10    }
11 }
```


```
1 int main()
2 {
3     initialize();
4
5     // simulate arbitrary
6     // loop iteration
7     global_var = nondet();
8
9     int i;
10    for(i=0; i < k+1; i++)
11    {
12        assume(
13            global_vars ∈ Range);
14        maintain();
15    }
16    assert(
17        global_vars ∈ Range);
18 }
```

Experiments and Results



Four software components /
CDD:

- Life Cycle Service
 - client
 - server
- Communication services:
 - COM: reading / writing to vehicle bus
 - Middleware: data transfer between hosts



Measurements:


- Frama-C (static analysis) time & mem.
- CBMC (model checking) time & mem. (Base case)
- CBMC (model checking) time & mem. (Inductive case)

Resources:


- Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5345@2.33GHz
- 47.2 GB of memory
- timeout: one hour

Experiment Results

Static Analysis:



Model Checking:



Overview

- Methodology for verification of AUTOSAR SW-C
 - Environment model
 - RTE Interface abstraction
 - k -induction encoding adapted for this problem
- Automated verification framework performing:
 - ① Parsing of AUTOSAR Specification
 - ② Generation of RTE interfaces abstraction
 - ③ Generation of a test harness (including base and inductive case of k -Induction)
 - ④ Parsing and Encoding of Static Analysis results (Frama-C)
 - ⑤ Verification with various tools
- Case Study on four real-world software components developed by TTTech

Automated Framework for verifying AUTOSAR SW-C

- Fully automated framework
- Suited to continuous integration
- Works for most SW-C
- Improvements necessary for the most complex cases

Further works

- Performance improvements
 - Better memory model (scaling issues)
 - Explore other verification tools (Depth-K, ESBMC...)
- Prove more advanced properties
 - Higher level properties (functional verification)
 - Non-interference between SW-C

Thank you!